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A fundamental assumption which has underpinned labour law since its inception as a discipline is 
that the ‘labour’ of labour law signifies labour that is remunerated. While debate may thrive over 
the varied forms which paid working arrangements can take, there remains wide agreement that the 
field of labour law corresponds with the field of paid work and that unremunerated labour carried 
out in the home or community is outside its scope.1 Challenges to this widely shared consensus 
occasionally arise, increasingly so as feminist scholars acquire a (still tenuous) grip on the discipline.2 
Nevertheless, such challenges rarely if ever disturb the core assumption that paid labour is a distinct 
domain of social activity inviting a distinct normative and regulatory response. So engrained is this 
assumption in the labour law psyche that feminist exhortations to expand the reach of labour law to 
encompass unpaid domestic labour are generally met with polite bewilderment.3 They are off the 
spectrum of serious consideration.  
The purpose of this paper is to trouble this consensus by excavating the material and philosophical 
roots of the distinction between paid and unpaid labour. It is important to remember that, like any 
conceptual framing, the paid/unpaid labour distinction is no more than an intellectual contrivance 
which may or may not correspond at any time or place with the material realities it seeks to 
represent. Labour law, as we know it, is a historical creation. It takes its form and purpose from the 
social concerns thrown up by industrial capitalism,4 reflecting a paradigm of industrial relations in 
which the central protagonists, capital and labour, are invariably at odds. It is the inevitability of 
industrial conflict in the context of sharp asymmetries of power in the individual employment 
relationship which gives labour law its purpose: ‘The main object of labour law’ Kahn-Freund 
declares, ‘has always been and I venture to say always will be, to be a countervailing force to 
counteract the inequality of bargaining power which is inherent, and must be inherent, in the 
employment relationship’.5 There are reasons to think that notwithstanding the absolute and 
universal terms in which Kahn-Freund cast his pronouncement, the employment relationship - and 
the contract of employment which underpins it - is no longer the lynchpin anchoring labour law in 
the early twenty-first century.6 Many questions have been raised about labour law’s reach and 
                                                 
1 The assumption that labour law correlates with paid work is generally taken for granted rather than explicitly 
stated but cf Matthew Finkin, ‘The Death and Transfiguration of Labor Law’ (2011) 33 Comparative Labor Law 
and Policy Journal 171, 177 (where Finkin reasserts the historical and contemporary linkage between labour 
law and ‘the institution of waged work’). 
2 My own engagement with the disciplinary parameters of labour law can be found in Joanne Conaghan, 
‘Work, Family and the Discipline of Labour Law’ in Labour Law, Work and Family, Joanne Conaghan & Kerry 
Rittich eds (Oxford, OUP, 2005) 26. For an excellent analytical overview of feminist labour law scholarship, see 
Judy Fudge, ‘From Women and Labour Law to Putting Gender and Law to Work’ in The Ashgate Research 
Companion to Feminist Legal Theory, Margaret Davies and Vanessa Munro eds (Farnham, Ashgate, 2013) 321.  
3 Finkin, n 1 above, 173. For a rare example of scholarship engaging directly with the notion that labour law 
extend beyond ‘nonmarket work’, see Noah Zatz, ‘The Impossibility of Work Law’ in The Idea of Labour Law, 
Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds (Oxford, OUP 2011), 234.  
4 Bob Hepple, ‘Factors Influencing the Making and Transformation of Labour Law in Europe’ in in Davidov and 
Langille, n 3, 30, 31-32; Harry Arthurs, ‘Labour Law after Labour’ ibid, 13. 
5 Otto Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law 2nd ed (London, Stevens & Sons, 1977) 6.  





scope,7 troubling the notion that labour regulation is solely or even predominantly concerned with 
what goes on in workplaces. Increasingly it is acknowledged that the regulatory field encompasses 
and/or engages broader efforts to manage labour markets and to mitigate the risks (for workers and 
employers) to which market-governed interactions frequently give rise.8 An unprecedented degree 
of uncertainty surrounds the object, concerns and bounds of the discipline proper as old concepts 
and certainties collapse in the face of new ideas and possibilities.9  
It is within the context of what many agree is a disciplinary crisis that the predication of labour law 
on a paid work paradigm comes under enhanced scrutiny. Radical changes in the gender 
demographics of paid work participation have highlighted the extent to which the social organisation 
of work in industrial societies is historically reliant on a gendered configuration of productive and 
reproductive activities that has become increasingly untenable.10 The interpenetration of the 
domains of work and family in legal and social policymaking, encapsulated in concerns about 
‘work/life balance’ or the ‘reconciliation of work and family responsibilities’11 also contributes to a 
discursive environment in which questions about the relation between paid and unpaid labour 
inevitably arise. How then did the distinction come about and how does it map onto broader ideas 
of political and social order? It is important to situate this enquiry against the background of a wider 
set of issues to which the slow but steady collapse of the paid work paradigm gives rise. Some of 
these issues are normative, raising concerns about how work is distributed and rewarded and how 
patterns of power relations - gender, race, and class - mediate these processes of distribution and 
reward. However, it is a recurrent misapprehension of labour law scholars to assume that the 
feminist focus on unpaid work is animated solely by egalitarian or justice-seeking aspirations. In fact, 
the feminist foregrounding of unpaid work is equally driven by concerns as to the value and utility of 
the analytical and conceptual frames through which labour law is commonly apprehended.12 It is 
with these primarily analytical concerns in mind that I embark upon a genealogical exploration of the 
emergence of the distinction between paid and unpaid work, with a view to historicising and 
denaturalising what continues to be a critical disciplinary frontier.13  
 
MATERIAL ORIGINS  
Modern labour law emerged as a response to the problems occasioned by industrialisation.14 Its 
particular history varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction but its essential forms and categories reflect 
the specific social and economic requirements of the transition from feudalism to capitalism: the 
shift from rural to urban living; the rise of a market economy; the separation of production from 
consumption and of workers from ownership and/or control of the means of production; and the 
                                                 
7 Guy Davidov usefully summarises these concerns in ‘Setting Labour Law’s Coverage: Between Universalism 
and Selectivity’ (2014) OJLS 543, 546-550. 
8 Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market: Industrialization, Employment and Legal 
Evolution (Oxford, OUP, 2005). 
9 See essays in Davidov & Langille, n 3 above.  
10 Deakin & Wilkinson, n 8 above, vii, 17; Judy Fudge, ‘The New Dual Earner Gender Contract: Work-life 
Balance or Working Time Flexibility’ in Conaghan & Rittich n 2 above, 261, 266-269. 
11 Eugenia Caracciolo di Torella and Annick Masselot, Reconciling Work and Family Life in EU Law and Policy 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).  
12 Judy Fudge, ‘A New Vocabulary and Imaginary for Labour Law: Taking Legal Constitution, Gender and Social 
Reproduction Seriously’ in The Future Regulation of Work, Douglas Brodie, Nicole Busby and Rebecca Zahn eds 
(London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2016) 9; Joanne Conaghan, ‘Labour Law and Feminist Method’ (2017) 33 
International J of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 93. 
13 For an exploration labour law’s ‘frontiers’, see Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law, Guy Davidov and 
Brian Langille eds (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006).  




demarcation of work and family into distinct spheres of activity. These are all well-documented 
historical phenomena giving rise to the forms of social organisation we apprehend today.15  
Let’s dwell for a moment on one aspect of this broad package of social changes, the demarcation of 
work and family into distinct spheres of activity. Imagine a world where workplaces, as we 
understand them, did not exist, or did not constitute the living experience of most ordinary people. 
In the subsistence economy of feudalism, peasants lived and worked the land of their lords, bound in 
a relationship of asymmetric obligations and undisguised hierarchy.16 For most people, home and 
work were one and the same, with men and women working together to support their families and 
communities: ‘Feudal relations of production tied the whole household rather than the individual to 
socially productive labour’.17 It would be wrong to romanticise this world as one of unabashed 
gender equality. Feudal society was characterised both by a sexual hierarchy and division of labour.18 
Responsibility for feeding, caring and nurturing family and community generally fell upon women 
but women also contributed to working the land and serving the lord and his family.19 The lives of 
peasants were hard, the lives of women particularly so; but what was not in doubt was that women 
worked; the labour they performed was critical to the survival of the family and community.20 In an 
economic and social world where, for most people, subsistence was a daily struggle, the value and 
importance of women’s contribution to the household economy was not in question.  
In the course of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, a process characterised in Marxist 
terminology as ‘primitive accumulation’21 and in England broadly corresponding with the 14th 
through to 17th centuries, this way of life broke down: Feudal privileges were repeatedly challenged 
and economic life became increasingly monetarised as money-rent replaced the old obligations to 
render labour services to feudal lords.22 This was a period in which economic inequalities 
deepened,23 and for women the shift from a subsistence-based to monetary economy was largely 
detrimental. With limited access to income or land and deepening patterns of gender stratification 
                                                 
15 There is a significant literature on the transition from feudalism to capitalism particularly within Marxism 
where debate has focused on the precise causes and drivers of economic and social change. See eg Maurice 
Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1946); Rodney Hilton (ed) 
The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism (London, Verso, 1978); T H Aston & C H E Philpin (eds) The 
Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe (Cambridge, 
CUP, 1985); Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Origins of Capitalism (New York, Monthly Review, 1999). (The latter 
provides an incisive overview of Marxist debate as well as her own analysis of the dynamics of transition).  
16 Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation (New York, 
Autonomedia, 2004) 21-50. 
17 Michele Barrett, Women’s Oppression Today 3rd ed (London, Verso, 1984) 177. There is a rich feminist 
literature on the pre-capitalist ‘family economy’ in which all family members engaged in the necessary labour 
to sustain the household. See especially Louise Tilly and Joan Wallach Scott, Women, Work and Family (Hove, 
Psychology Press, 1987) chs 1-3; Bridget Hill, Women, Work and Sexual Politics in Eighteenth Century England 
(London, Routledge, 1989) chs 3 & 4. 
18 Chris Middleton, ‘The Sexual Division of Labour in Feudal England’ New Left Review 1-113-114 January-April 
1979 147.    
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. Within the family economy, women did both work we would characterise as housework (domestic 
labour) and work we would classify as production, ie making goods and produce for use and/or exchange (see 
further Hill n 17 above, 24-25). 
21 Karl Marx, Capital Vol 1, Part VIII (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1983). 
22 Federici, n 16 above 28-30 and 72-75. 
23 Chris Middleton, ‘Patriarchal Exploitation and the Rise of English Capitalism’ in Eva Gamarnikow, David 




in wage labour,24 women became increasingly economically dependent on men.25 Displaced people 
flocked to towns which operated as commercial centres supported by craft guilds but also created 
wage labour opportunities. In the early social chaos following the breakdown of serfdom, 
opportunities for women sometimes arose.26 However, in general the social and economic 
restructuring process accompanying the transition to industrial capitalism closed down rather than 
opened up opportunities for women and, indeed, for most working men.27  
The historian, E P Thomson, tracks the social disciplining of the working class into new working 
habits centred on the needs of industrial production. He documents the transition from ‘task-
oriented time’, structured around the cyclical activities of rural life, to ‘timed labour’, in which a 
labourer’s time became the measure of his wage, which was in turn dependent upon his employer’s 
needs.28 In a production-for-use economy, where subsistence, not profit, governed social and labour 
activities, the household was the centre of activity and ‘social intercourse and labour [were] 
intermingled’.29  With the rise of a production-for-exchange (markets), ‘productive’ labour moved 
out of the household and into the mills and factories so that a cleavage between ‘home’ and ‘work’ 
emerged.30 Working patterns changed and the idea of the working day – of working to time not task 
– took hold. It was clearly in the interests of employers to secure as much of workers’ time as 
possible and, not surprisingly, the process of industrialisation witnessed intense class struggle over 
working time, culminating in the nineteenth century Factory Acts and associated measures.31 In the 
early stages of industrialisation, women as well as men were drawn into the mills and factories.32 At 
the same time, social reproductive work – feeding, caring for, and reproducing labour – still needed 
to be done. Indeed, in a context in which labour was perceived as the prime source of economic 
                                                 
24 Middleton, n 18 above, 159-162. 
25 Federici, n 16 above, 74: ‘As soon as land was privatised and monetary relations began to dominate 
economic life, [women] found it more difficult than men to support themselves, being increasingly confined to 
reproductive labour at the very time when this work was being completely devalued’.   
26 Martha Howell, ‘Gender in the Transition to Merchant Capitalism’ in Judith Bennett and Ruth Mazo Karras 
(eds) The Oxford Handbook of Women and Gender in Medieval Europe (Oxford, OUP, 2013) 561; Federici, n 16 
above, 31. 
27 Early feminist studies of women’s work took diverging approaches to the question of whether women’s 
status and position improved or declined as a consequence of capitalism. Alice Clark, writing in 1919 (The 
Working Life of Women in Seventeenth Century England (London, Frank Cass & Co, 1968)) thought women 
were better off in the pre-industrial era whereas Ivy Pinchbeck, in her classic work, Women Workers and the 
Industrial Revolution 1750-1850 (London, Virago, 1981, first published 1930) viewed industrialisation as 
providing greater opportunities for women to engage in waged labour. This divergence continues to resonate 
in feminist histories of women’s work although recent analyses are more nuanced and equivocal, 
acknowledging both continuity and change in women’s working lives under capitalism. See collected essays by 
Pamela Sharpe, Bridget Hill and Jean Bennett in P Sharpe (ed) Women’s Work: the English Experience 1650-
1914 (London, Arnold, 1998) Part 1. 
28 E P Thompson, ‘Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism’ in Customs in Common (Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 1991) 352, 358.  
29 Ibid, 358. 
30 Or, as Thompson puts it, between ‘life’ and ‘work’ (ibid). For a feminist reading of Thompson’s analysis of 
working time, see Joanne Conaghan, ‘Time to Dream? Flexibilities, Families and the Regulation of Working 
Time’ in Judy Fudge and Rosemary Owens (eds) Precarious Work, Women and the New Economy (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2005) 101, 1-6-110. 
31 See Marx, n 21 above, Ch XVII on the importance of working time to the extraction of surplus value.  On the 
gender dimensions of 19th century working class struggle to limit the length of the working day, see Sylvia 
Walby, Patriarchy at Work (London, Polity Press, 1986) 97-134.  
32 There is evidence that in early industrialisation women workers dominated certain manufacturing sectors 
such as textiles and weaving (Maxine Berg, ‘What difference did women’s work make to the Industrial 




value,33 never more so. Thus, most working women’s lives tended to comprise both work to support 
the family income, in the form of waged labour, alongside the many activities typically required to 
sustain and reproduce labour power.  
This is the historical and material context in which a notion of labour equating with paid labour took 
shape and form: The advent of industrial capitalism triggered a reconfiguration of the labour process 
which split ‘domestic’ and ‘industrial’ labour, affecting perceptions of the character and value of the 
work performed.34 With productive and reproductive work no longer temporally and spatially 
aligned, their distinctiveness became more pronounced, assuming  a tangible visible form, which 
intensified and naturalised the sexual division of labour.35  Productive labour became spatially 
associated with a place of work - a workplace – while reproductive labour became the province of 
family life, physically located in the home, which also served as a retreat from the demanding rigours 
of the production line. Reproductive work became less valued, in part because it was performed by 
women within a context of social intensification of sexual difference, but also because it was no 
longer seen to be contributing economically: it did not generate a wage.36 Although reproductive 
work remained equally essential to the survival of the family unit, in a world in which money now 
measured value, it did not appear so.37 
During the nineteenth century the bourgeois ‘cult of domesticity’, expressed in the idea that 
women’s place is in the home, gradually spread its tentacles to encompass and define working class 
aspirations.38 This dominant ideology of the Victorian period conjured up a social vision in which 
women devoted themselves to the ‘private’ sphere of home and family while men occupied the 
‘public’ world of market and politics.39 Such a sharp delineation of gender roles was always more 
ideal than real, particularly for working class women, most of whom continued to engage in wage 
labour to some degree as a matter of economic necessity40 but there is no denying that, during the 
nineteenth century, women’s access to paid work became an increasing focus of social and political 
conflict: Among bourgeois women the primary concern (in the face of strong male resistance) was 
access to the professions and related occupations;41 within the working class, women’s employment 
became a significant focus of capitalist-labour conflict over matters such as sex-based wage 
differentials and the length of the working day.42 By the twentieth century, with the development of 
                                                 
33 This was a period when the labour theory of value was gaining traction (see especially the work of David 
Ricardo and later, Karl Marx).    
34 Wally Secombe, ‘The Housewife and her Labour under Capitalism’ New Left Review I 83 January-February 
1974, 3, 5-6.   
35 Much of 19th century debate concerning restrictions on women’s employment drew upon notions of 
women’s ‘natural’ duty to care for their families and the moral and social harm occasioned by their inability to 
do so while they were engaged in paid work. See Walby, n 31 above, 112-116.   
36 Domestic work carried out by servants did command some form of remuneration (generally including board 
and lodgings) although it was low paid and often deeply exploitative (Hill, n 17 above ch 8). During 
industrialisation, domestic service became the main form of employment for young working-class women; 
moreover, women vastly outnumbered men as domestic servants (ibid 125-126). On the history of domestic 
work regulation, see Einat Albin, ‘From Domestic Servant to “Domestic Worker”’ in Challenging the Legal 
Boundaries of Work Regulation, J Fudge, S McCrystal & K Sankaran eds (Oxford, Hart, 2012) 231. 
37 Changes in how domestic labour was perceived and valued occurred gradually over a lengthy period; there is 
evidence that in early capitalism women’s contribution to the household was still regarded as economically 
essential (Middleton, above n 23, 21-24).  
38 Joanna Bourke, ‘Housewifery in Working Class England 1860-1914’ in Sharpe n 27 above, 332. 
39 Pamela Sharpe, Introduction’ in Sharpe, n 27 above, 1, 10. 
40 See eg Amanda Vickery ‘Golden Age to Separate Spheres’ in Sharpe, n 27 above, 294 critiquing the idea of 
separate spheres as a characterisation of working class women’s lives in the Victorian era.  
41 Candida Ann Lacey (ed) Barbara Leigh Smith Bodichon and the Langham Place Group (London, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1987). 




the welfare state, a distinct social model had emerged to support the organisation of work in the 
industrial world: the male breadwinner/female caregiver model43 was an unequivocally gendered 
order based upon a sharp distinction between work and family life and the promise -  or myth - of a 
‘family wage’.44 Within this social imaginary, work and family appeared to operate autonomously, 
serving different social functions and meeting different human needs. Care work became the 
province of family; no longer viewed as a necessary economic contribution to social well-being, it 
attracted no wage and was conceived as freely given and naturally expressive of relations of affect 
and intimacy. Paid work took place outside the family realm; it was visibly economic in character and 
expressed in formal legal relations of mutuality and exchange. Of critical importance, the world of 
paid work, now spatially aligned with the ‘workplace’, was predicated on the assumption that 
‘workers’ were exclusively available for the duration of the period they were contracted to work, 
unencumbered by care work which was carried out elsewhere. Thus, while industrial production 
remained materially reliant upon unpaid care work to ensure, on a daily and generational basis, that 
labour was reproduced, this reliance, was obscured both by the physical and conceptual separation 
of work and family and the naturalisation of distinct gender roles. The old world in which productive 
and reproductive activities appeared inextricably entwined in material life processes had 
disappeared.  
 
PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS  
The brief account offered above cannot pass for a proper exploration of what was unquestionably a 
huge transformation in social and economic life, taking place over a lengthy period and the product 
of complex, often conflicting forces and demands. Nevertheless, it serves for our purposes to 
identify a notional moment when production and reproduction materialised as separate and distinct 
realms of social activity. The analysis so far has focused on the material dimensions of this process of 
separation but it is important too to highlight the contribution of philosophical ideas to a worldview 
in which gender and labour became simultaneously aligned (in the naturalisation of a sexual division 
of labour) and dissociated (in the reconfiguration of the labour process to exclude women’s 
reproductive work). Philosophy does not emerge in a vacuum. While philosophical texts are often 
read as if they speak across time and space, philosophical ideas take their shape and substance, their 
concerns and preoccupations, within specific social, economic and political contexts. Inevitably then, 
philosophical ideas connect at some level with the historical conditions from which they arise.  
It is no coincidence that amidst the social disruption wrought by early capitalism, radical new ideas 
appeared about the proper ordering of government and society, ideas which challenged the 
absolutism of monarchs and championed notions of freedom and formal equality.45 During the 
seventeenth century, in particular, a new political imaginary gained currency, crafted by political 
theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke and framed in terms of an idealised ‘social 
contract’46 which seemed to offer a justification for political authority more attuned to the economic 
                                                 
43 Jane Lewis, ‘The Decline of the Male Breadwinner Model’ (2001) 8/2 Social Politics 152; Nancy Fraser, ‘After 
the Family Wage: A Postindustrial Thought Experiment’ in Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the 
‘Postsocialist’ Condition (New York, Routledge, 1997) 41.  
44 Michele Barrett and Mary McIntosh, ‘The “Family Wage”: Some Problems for Socialists and Feminists’ in 
Terry Lovell (ed) British Feminist Thought in the Second Wave (Oxford, Blackwell, 1990) 134, 139.  
45 Ellen Meiksins Wood & Neal Wood, A Trumpet of Sedition: Political Theory and the Rise of Capitalism 1509-
1688 (London, Pluto Press, 1997).   
46 The term ‘social contract’ derives from Jean Jacques Rousseau’s essay of the same title (Du Contrat Social) 
published in 1762. However, social contract theory has earlier origins and is closely associated with the 
writings of Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan (1651)) and John Locke (Two Treatises of Government (1689)) a century 




and social needs of a market-based economy.47 At the heart of this new political framework (from 
which we can glean the origins of modern liberalism) was an insistence that all men are by nature 
equal and free to pursue their own interests and that political authority derives from the free 
consent of the governed.48 Such a vision contrasted radically with traditional notions of political 
power, predicated on the assumption that the authority of the monarch was absolute and divinely 
ordained and that the organisation of society simply reflected a status-based, deeply hierarchical 
natural order.  
At first glance, such challenges to old assumptions about nature and the social order seem promising 
in terms of their potential to disrupt traditional notions of gender roles and relations. As 
seventeenth century feminist philosopher, Mary Astell, expostulated, ‘If all men are born free how is 
it that all women are born as slaves?’49 Unfortunately, and notwithstanding this visible tension, the 
emancipatory benefits of these innovative political ideas were not extended to women; indeed, the 
rise of liberal thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries coincided with an intensification 
of gender discrimination (understood in the multiple senses of the word).50 Nevertheless, while the 
view that women were properly subject to the authority of men persisted, it did present problems 
for radical political thought. As Andrea Nye observes, ‘this was treacherous ground: if nature was 
allowed to dictate women’s subordination it might also dictate other forms of subordination’.51 
Matters were further complicated because the main argument raised against social contract 
conceptions of political authority invoked the notion of patriarchal authority to defend the divine 
right of kings.52 How could social contractarians, at one and the same time, conjure up a state of 
nature in which everyone was assumed to be free and equal while simultaneously endorsing the 
gendered hierarchy of the family?  
The answer to this is complicated and, most scholars concur, not terribly satisfactory. In particular, 
while Hobbes and Locke both seemed to concede women’s equality in a state of nature,53 neither 
adequately explained how and why women go on to ‘agree’ to be subject to male authority.54 Much 
                                                 
47 Wood and Wood, n 45 above, ch 1.  
48 For a useful summary of the origins and key features of social contract theory, see G D H Cole Introduction’ 
to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses (London, Dent & Sons 1973) xi, xvii-xxii.   
49 Mary Astell, Preface to the 3rd edition of Some Reflections upon Marriage (1706). 
50 Teresa Brennan and Carole Pateman, ‘”Mere Auxiliaries to the Commonwealth”: Women and the Origins of 
Liberalism’ (1979) Political Studies 163, 196-7; Merry Wiesner-Hanks, Women and Gender in Early Modern 
Europe (Cambridge, CUP, 2008) (on intensification of legal restrictions on women); and Thomas Laqueur, 
Making Sex: Body and Gender From the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1990) ch 5 (on 
changing ideas of gender difference in the Enlightenment period).  
51 Andrea Nye, Feminism and Modern Philosophy (New York, Routledge, 2004) 52-53. The institution of slavery 
presented similar problems for social contract theorists.   
52 The most famous exponent of patriarchal theory in this period was Robert Filmer, whose Patriarcha (1680) 
was the focus of extended critique by Locke in the first of his Two Treatises. According to Filmer, God gave the 
first father (Adam) absolute monarchical power which was then passed on via procreation to Adam’s sons. 
Filmer also argued that Eve was placed by God in a position of natural subordination to her husband (see 
further Locke’s Two Treatises, I: II).   
53 Hobbes considers the position of women in the state of nature in two key texts, De Cive. The English Version 
entitled in the first edition Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society (1651) and Leviathan 
(1651) in both of which he is at best ambiguous about the equality of the sexes. See further Gabriella Slomp, 
‘Hobbes and the Equality of Women’ (1994) Political Studies XLII, 441. Given limits of space and time, I 
concentrate primarily on Locke’s philosophical writing here. 
54 There are significant differences between Hobbes and Locke in their portrayal of women’s position in the 
state of nature but ultimately neither theorist is really interested in troubling the notion that women should be 




feminist ink has been spilt probing the philosophical texts here55 and the best that can be said is that 
the logic and rationality upon which these great philosophers placed such value appears to have 
been sacrificed on the altar of expediency when it comes to accounting for women’s position.56 It is 
true that in is Two Treatises of Government, Locke tried to counter the patriarchal challenge by 
drawing a distinction between ‘political’ power, on the one hand, and ‘paternal’ power, on the 
other. Political power he argued, resided in the sphere of ‘civil government’ and included, inter alia, 
‘the right of making laws with penalties of death… and of employing the force of the community in 
the execution of such laws’.57 Paternal power encompassed the authority exercised by parents over 
their children and which arose from ’that duty which is incumbent on [parents] to take care of their 
offspring during the imperfect state of childhood’.58 Because political and paternal authority were of 
different kinds, Locke’s argument ran, the family could not be presented as a model for political 
power, as Filmer and others suggested.59 Note that Locke speaks here of parents not fathers; 
mothers he concedes have ‘equal title’ to paternal power.60 At the same time, Locke is never in 
doubt that ultimate parental jurisdiction lies with fathers. This is not really explained other than in 
vague allusions to men’s natural superiority over women.61 It seems that Locke’s concept of 
parenting is already endowed with gendered features, creating distinct categories of ‘mother’ and 
‘father’ which carry naturally differing roles. Social characteristics, in other words, have been 
inexplicably grafted onto the natural state. It is fathers, Locke observes, who ‘ordinarily’ have the 
power ‘to bestow their estates on those who please them best’.62 In this sly elision of paternal and 
property rights, Locke inadvertently reveals himself; for the freedom to acquire and dispose of 
property is a critical feature of his political vision, a natural right to which all in theory are entitled 
but which women, by virtue of their sex, social role, and, not least, legal status, are not in a position 
to exercise.63 
Let’s now begin to track the links between these emerging ideas about the proper ordering of 
government and the family and the material transformation of work relations during the rise of 
capitalism. First, one sees in Locke’s distinction between paternal and political power the re-
inscription of a much older divide between public and private spheres.64 The precise correlation of 
public and private with spatial and/or conceptual boundaries is ambiguous; in some contexts, home 
or family signifies the realm of the private in contrast to the public world of market or commerce; in 
                                                 
55 The classic feminist critique of social contract theory is Carol Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Cambridge, 
Polity Press, 1988). On Hobbes and/or Locke specifically, see Slomp, n 53 above; Brennan & Pateman, n 50, 
above; Nye, n 51 above, ch 3.   
56 See ibid commenting that Locke ‘asserted women’s independence when it helped his case. He resorted to 
nature to preserve her domestic status’ (55).   
57 Locke, Two Treatises, II:I. 
58 Ibid, II:VI:58. 
59 ibid II:VI:71: ‘But these two powers, political and paternal, are so perfectly distinct and separate, and built 
upon so different foundations and given to so different ends…’  
60 Ibid, II:VI:52.  
61 See eg II:VII:82: ‘But the husband and wife, though they have but one common concern, yet having different 
understandings, will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too. It therefore being necessary that the last 
determination (i.e. the rule) should be placed somewhere, it naturally falls to the man’s share as the abler and 
stronger’ (my emphasis). 
62 ibid, II:VI:72.  
63 Under the doctrine of coverture which governed married women’s status in England until the late 
nineteenth century, married women could not own, receive or transfer property as, on entering marriage, 
their legal personhood merged with and became absorbed in that of their husbands. Thus, when Locke was 
writing about property-owning, it was within a frame of legal reference in which married women could not 
hold property. See generally William Blackstone, Commentaries of the Laws of England, Vol 1 ch XV.   
64 On the ‘ancient origins’ of the public / private dichotomy, see eg Margaret Thornton, ‘The Cartography of 




others, private relations encompass both home and market (‘private enterprise’) while the 
relationship between individuals and the state is designated public.65 Thornton, among others, 
argues that ‘public’ and ‘private’ are best understood not as distinct realms or sites but as a 
particular mode of thinking which permeates political and legal thought, serving multiple, 
sometimes conflicting purposes.66 Among those purposes, designations of public and private are 
often used to signify difference and/or to assign value.67 Locke’s implicit invocation of the 
public/private divide, expressed in his distinction between political and paternal power, serves both 
functions: It constitutes family and society/state as different in kind and thereby allows the latter, 
not the former, to seize the attention of political philosophy. The family, relations and activities 
therein, are placed outside the sphere of political contemplation.  
How does wage labour fit into this picture?  Locke famously viewed labour as self-owned; the 
capacity to work constituted a form of property which was alienable just like any other market 
commodity. Locke in particular placed great theoretical weight on the notion that ‘every man has 
“property” in his own “person”’68 as this formed the justification for property-owning more 
generally: ‘The “labour” of his body and the “work” of his hands we may say are properly his. 
Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed 
his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property’.69 
Labour then was a source of value. The process of ‘mixing’ one’s labour with the resources bestowed 
by Nature produced something the labourer was entitled to appropriate; similarly, if one sold one’s 
labour to another and that labour was applied in this way, the thing produced would belong to the 
person who had purchased the labour. Locke’s conception of wage labour was necessarily 
contractual because it was only through voluntary agreement that one’s labour could be 
appropriated by another: ‘A free man makes himself a servant to another by selling him for a certain 
time the service he undertakes to do in exchange for the wages he is to receive’.70  
This contractual model was only partially mirrored in law. Writing less than a century later, 
Blackstone made clear that the master and servant relationship, while created by contract, was far 
from determined by free agreement in all its particulars.71  Once the service relationship came into 
being, the obligations between the parties – and these varied depending on the type of service 
contracted for72 - derived from the formal status the parties had assumed and the law now 
determined. Contract was merely the mechanism for bringing into being a status-governed 
relationship.73 Although the later stages of industrialisation witnessed an intensification of freedom 
of contract rhetoric in political discourse, it was not until the late nineteenth century that the 
statutory framework governing master and servant law was dismantled.74 Even then, the status 
elements of the service relationship were not so much displaced by as submerged within an 
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overarching contractual frame incorporating common law implied terms.75 Indeed, the retention of a 
significant status element to the labour contract proved critical to the transition to a mature 
industrial society, providing a means of disciplining workers and facilitating the restructuring of 
traditional working habits.76  Thus, notwithstanding that wage labour took a contractual form, the 
nature of the relationship was (and arguably remains) essentially one of subjection: ‘there can be no 
employment relation without a power to command a duty to obey’.77  
Let’s turn now to marriage in social contract theory: this too was conceived as contractual: ‘conjugal 
society’ Locke observes ‘is made by a voluntary compact between man and woman’.78 Moreover, 
like the labour contract, marriage created a relationship of subjection: ‘it can be no other subjection 
than what every wife owes her husband’.79 What then of a wife’s labour? In his discussion of the 
property-producing value of labour, Locke makes no formal distinction between men and women’s 
labour although not infrequently he speaks of the putative property owner as a ‘man and his 
family’.80 His assumption is that men acquire property to support and benefit their families but that 
families themselves lie beyond the sphere of production and property acquisition, constituting a 
separate ‘little commonwealth’ comprising ‘a master of a family with all these subordinate relations 
of wife, children, servants and slaves’.81  In this account, women and the labour they typically 
perform is implicitly distanced from productive activities, consigned to a separate and autonomous 
realm of activity with its own peculiar mode of governance and social order.  
The reality of the times was rather different. At the time Locke was writing (the late seventeenth 
century), the process of separation of economic production from the household was still at a 
relatively early stage, Most women of the labouring classes engaged not just in what we would now 
perceive as ‘domestic’ duties but also in the family business or trade; they were a visible part of 
economic life.82 The model of work and family described by Locke was very much an ideal, 
supporting his vision of a property-owning society of atomic individuals contracting freely in the 
marketplace. Locke himself was employed by the Earl of Shaftesbury who was strongly aligned with 
Parliamentarians in seventeenth century conflicts with the Crown: Many argue that Locke’s Two 
Treatises was written as a political manifesto for parliamentary government. Thus, the interests to 
which Locke addressed himself were not those of working people but the propertied classes; Locke 
spoke to the concerns of property accumulators.  
We have seen that during the course of the seventeenth century and thereafter, opportunities for 
women to be economically independent progressively diminished.83 This was part of a broader 
process of restructuring of work relations under industrial capitalism but was also a product of 
working class resistance to the deleterious consequences that industrialisation visited upon working 
lives. Working men challenged women’s employment in part because women’s wages undercut 
men’s but also because the quality of their lives and the well-being of their families were seriously 
threatened by the harsh material conditions in which working people lived and worked.84 By the 
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nineteenth century, Locke’s domestic ideal was one to which all consciously aspired85 and an 
archetype of the property-owning individual and his family cut from the cloth of social contract 
theory was visibly embodied in the lives of a burgeoning middle-class. This ‘possessive individual’, as 
C B MacPherson describes him, was proprietor of his own person and capacities, independent of the 
will of others and entering agreements only in so far as they served his own interests.86 At the same 
time, as MacPherson goes on to point out, the theoretical assumptions underpinning the possessive 
individual (which MacPherson derives primarily from Hobbes and Locke) were undermined in 
practice by the reality of capitalist exploitation ‘in which full individuality for some was produced by 
consuming the individuality of others’.87  
For MacPherson, possessive individualism was flawed because the very conditions which gave rise to 
this ideal eventually destroyed it by eroding social cohesion (through the development of class 
consciousness) and (re)embedding inequality in social relations.88 He concludes: ‘the greatness of 
seventeenth century liberalism was its assertion of the free rational individual as the criterion of the 
good society; its tragedy was that this very assertion was necessarily a denial of individualism to half 
the nation’.89 For MacPherson, the ‘half the nation’ denied was the exploited working class who 
failed to benefit from the liberal promise of the social contractarian vision. Yet, how much more 
starkly denied were women, who struggled even notionally to meet the criteria for possessive 
individualism. Women were not self-owners; they were effectively the property of their husbands, 
reflected not just in Locke’s imaginary of ‘the little commonwealth’ of subordinate relations but also 
in the common law doctrine of coverture by which a woman’s person was absorbed in that of 
husband at the point of marriage, her basic civil rights, including her right to contract or hold 
property wholly extinguished.90  Even a woman’s body belonged to her husband conferring a right of 
sexual access regardless of her will or preference.91 Together these laws ensured that a woman’s 
labour was at the disposal of her husband and master; it was, for all intents and purposes, his.  
Although these patriarchal laws dated back to the Norman conquest, their practical impact 
intensified as changes in the social and economic organisation of labour further weakened women’s 
status and autonomy.92 Women’s gradual exclusion from forms of employment previously open to 
them, along with the collapse of the family economy heralding the spatial separation of productive 
and reproductive activities, generated new social conditions for the operation of coverture laws. In 
particular, workers’ increasing dependence on wage labour sat uneasily alongside a legal regime 
which denied women the right to their own earnings. It is true that in practice, the effects of 
coverture were primarily the concern of the propertied classes. As Joan Perkin observes, working 
women’s earnings, though technically their husband’s property, would go directly into feeding the 
family; moreover, working-class men were without the means to enforce the law.93 At the same 
time, there is some contemporary speculation that the laws governing married women’s earnings 
actively discouraged women from engaging in paid work.94   
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It is time now to pull the threads of the argument together: how does all this relate to the distinction 
between paid and unpaid labour and the exclusion of the latter from the field of labour law? We 
have first a process of economic and social restructuring in which productive and reproductive 
activities become spatially and conceptually separated from one another and firmly entrenched 
along gender lines. The social and economic consequences of this process for working people are 
generally bad, for women doubly so. Then we see the emergence of a political philosophical outlook 
which promotes the rights and freedoms of the possessive individual, self-owning acquisitive and 
economically driven. This is a vision in which economic activity becomes the purpose of political 
power and economic success the measure of political worth. At the same time, the sphere of politics 
is formally distinguished from that of the family, captured in Locke’s distinction between political 
and paternal power. The distinctiveness of these realms is essential to Locke’s argument for it 
explains why the natural hierarchy governing family life should not also serve as a model for political 
governance: ‘that the power of a magistrate over his subject may be distinguished from that of a 
father over his children, a master over his servant, a husband over his wife…’95  
Women’s subjection to men within the construct of the family is taken outside the realm of political 
consideration; the labour they perform therein formally distanced from the economic world of 
property accumulation. The actual work that they do in the home may be very productive; they may 
weave or craft, cook or sew, plant or harvest. However, the social relations which govern this 
productive process are distinct from those that govern the market; they do not command a wage 
and are not viewed as economic in character. The construction of work and family as separate and 
distinct realms of governance presents no difficulties for men who straddle the two spheres with 
ease. Women however struggle and are increasingly encouraged to confine themselves to hearth 
and home. It is here that we begin to glimpse the interdependence of the social contractarian ideal 
and a particular gendered order which denies women the privileges of free individuals, placing them 
in a formal relation of subjection to men. Carol Pateman explains this by invoking the notion of the 
‘sexual contract’. She argues that the original social contract of class contract theory, in which free 
men come together and agree to be governed in their collective interests, presupposes a sexual 
contract taking the form of a ‘patriarchal’ or ‘sex-right’ which allows men to exercise power over 
women.96 This power is perceived as necessary not least because marriage and primogeniture 
served as a primary mechanism for the accumulation and transmission of property rights within 
families.97   
The sexual contract, Pateman argues, is a ‘repressed’ dimension of social contract theory but one 
which nevertheless explains the many ambiguities and confusions which inhere in social 
contractarian accounts of women’s social and political status. Critical to Pateman’s argument is the 
way in which sex difference is utilised to explain and justify capitalist social relations: ‘capitalists can 
exploit workers and husbands can exploit wives because workers and wives are constituted as 
subordinates through the employment contract and the marriage contract’.98 In other words, 
although contract is conceived as a means of expressing and assuring individual freedom, it actually 
serves as a mechanism for the creation of relations of domination and subordination.99 The worker 
by agreeing to sell his labour places himself in a position of subjection to his master, the wife by 
agreeing to marriage becomes subject to her husband; her person is his property, the worker’s 
labour the property of his master. It is property, not contract, which is the critical concept here. 
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There is yet more to this story. What makes a man ‘free’ to sell his labour? What allows the capitalist 
to command a worker’s time exclusively and without encumbrance? As Pateman, among many 
modern commentators, points out, ‘the employment contract presupposes the marriage contract. 
Or to make this point another way, the construction of the “worker” presupposes that he is a man 
who has a woman, a (house)wife to take care of his daily needs’.100 The new ‘rhythms of industrial 
life’101 demanded not only that workers be disciplined into more regimented ways of working (in 
contrast to the irregular, subsistence-governed rhythms of pre-industrial life) but that as much of 
workers’ time as could be provided was at the disposal of masters. Thompson puts it thus: ‘What we 
are examining here are not only changes in manufacturing technique which demand greater 
synchronisation of labour and a greater exactitude in time-routines in any society… we are 
concerned simultaneously with time-sense in its technological conditioning and with time-
measurement as a means of exploitation’.102  The primacy thus placed on workers’ time required a 
form of social organisation which not only maximised their availability to work but also ensured that 
the labour so vital to productive activities was reproduced on a daily and generational basis. Social 
reproduction, ‘the social processes and labour that go into the daily and generational maintenance 
of the working population’,103 became the province of the family and the responsibility primarily of 
women. Their domestic labour became vital to the process of paid labour exploitation; their sexual 
difference both the explanation and justification for their distinct and undervalued role. Excluded 
from the world of possessive individuals, confined to a sphere of ‘natural’ subjection, women’s 
unfree status became formally enshrined in the grammar and assumptions of philosophical and 
political thought. 
 
LABOUR LAW AND THE FUTURE OF THE PAID WORK PARADIGM  
A close interrogation of the material origins of and philosophical justifications for the distinction 
between paid and unpaid labour, manifest in the spatial and conceptual separation of productive 
and reproductive activities and embedded, inter alia, in labour law theory and discourse, reveals 
that the distinction is not natural or inevitable but constructed and correspondent with the 
particular configuration of social and work relations which emerged with industrial capitalism. In its 
origins, justifications and applications, the paid/unpaid work distinction is also deeply gendered. 
Should we be worried that our discipline remains significantly reliant upon a distinction of 
problematic origins, dubious rationality, and systematically gender-disadvantaging effects? The 
answer is yes and for a number of pressing reasons properly the concern of labour law scholars. 
Chief among these is that the historically produced, economically compelled separation of work and 
family is breaking down, bringing into sharper focus their hitherto obscured interdependence.104 The 
last half century has witnessed a period of major economic restructuring which Fraser describes as 
‘the death throes of the old industrial gender order with the transition to a new postindustrial phase 
of capitalism’.105 Features of this brave new world include the steep decline of manufacturing, rise of 
flexible and precarious forms of work, technologically-driven transformation of working practices, 
demise of the family wage, shrinking of the welfare state, and increasing participation of women in 
paid labour, the latter generating a policy demand for the reconciliation of work and family 
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responsibilities.106 The drive to enhance productivity and economic competitiveness, aligned with 
the dwindling returns provided by social insurance, demand that women (as well as other 
‘dependents’) should actively participate in paid labour.107 The old normative order in which the 
male breadwinner was expected to engage in paid work while the female caregiver attended 
exclusively to domestic responsibilities has buckled under the weight of new economic and social 
priorities.  
The sexual contract implicit in social contractarian thought is collapsing.108 Gendered social 
arrangements which emerged from and took particular form within the context of industrialisation 
no longer serve the purpose of resolving the incipient tension between the imperatives of 
production and reproduction.109 The emergence of work/life conflict in modern labour law is both a 
symptom of and response to the decline of the old sexual contract. While traditionally in labour law 
work and family were seem as antithetical, as two separate spheres which occasionally collided 
usually when women’s employment was at issue,  with wider social and economic changes work and 
family are now visibly interpenetrating; their gender-segregated boundaries are becoming blurred 
(witness the ‘feminisation’ of labour), their activities increasingly co-mingling.110 This is not just a 
product of the huge increase in female workforce participation over the last few decades,111 
generating new pressures for men to assume a greater share of domestic labour. It is also a result of 
unprecedented advances in communications and other forms of information technology, enabling 
work to be carried on outside a workplace under the continued surveillance and control of 
employers.112 The old workplace - the factory, the mill, the office, is becoming redundant - the 
spatial separation of production and reproduction no longer economically required. We are not 
necessarily seeing the end of gender-based disadvantage in the social organisation of work – recall 
that a sexual division of labour pre-existed the economic transition to capitalism – but we are seeing 
the end of the old gender order.113 This brings both opportunities and risks. On the one hand, it 
makes it possible for women to aspire to the liberal promise, to become self-owning property 
accumulators through the commodification and alienation of their labour. On the other hand, it 
exposes them – and workers more broadly - to new forms of subjection and exploitation114 while, at 
the same time, throwing into serious question the adequacy of social reproductive arrangements 
which are reliant on the traditional family.  
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In particular, with the demise of the old gender contract, the problem of care looms large. The social 
impact of global economic restructuring on women’s capacity to engage in unpaid domestic labour 
along with the contraction of social care provision and rising life expectancy has generated a growing 
care deficit, leading to the increasing commodification and privatisation of care work supported by 
the transnational movement of workers to meet the care needs of the (more) privileged.115 The 
breakdown of social reproduction in the post-industrial world connects to a wide range of pressing 
concerns relating to human capabilities, from working conditions and quality of life, to education, 
health and well-being, wealth and income inequality, social and cultural cohesion. Women are no 
longer in a position to bear the weight of such problems, although to varying degrees they still do.116 
Meanwhile, ‘new’ kinds of labour exploitation demand attention, from the legal (re)production of 
precarity117 to the regulatory and ethical complexities of global care chains,118 as novel 
configurations of race, sex and class based inequality take shape and form. The concern here is not 
just with developing appropriate regulatory norms to address the many and complex problems 
arising from the breakdown of the old gender contract, but to ensure too that we are not so 
invested in a disciplinary frame which has been historically blind to gendered operations as to fail to 
recognise that a new gender contract is currently under construction.  
What form might such a contract take? Nancy Fraser suggests that to resolve the tension between 
productive and reproductive needs while at the same time ensuring gender equity, we must adopt a 
‘universal caregiver’ model.119 Work relations must be reconfigured so that women’s current life 
patterns (in which balancing work and family responsibilities tend to be central) become the norm 
for everyone.120 This she argues is the only solution which will ensure both gender equality and go 
some way to meet the care deficit, particularly in a context in which people are living longer, 
pension pots are shrinking and the modern state no longer can or will assume a significant share of 
responsibility for care provision. Nicole Busby makes a similar intervention arguing that rather than 
responding to the care dilemma by extending employment rights to carers,121 we should promote 
caring rights for workers.122  
Both Fraser and Busby foreground social reproductive needs in their efforts to reimagine and/or 
reconstruct the world of work. This becomes their normative and regulatory starting point; but what 
kind of labour law might thus ensue? Busby sketches an outline of a legal right to care predicated on 
making carer status a protected ground of discrimination and imposing on employers a duty of 
reasonable accommodation.123 Other scholars have proposed stricter regulation of working time; for 
example, Vicki Schultz and Alison Hoffman make the case for a shorter working week to ensure care 
work is performed and fairly distributed.124 This latter suggestion also resonates with broader 
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concerns about job contraction in the context of technological advances in robotics and artificial 
intelligence.125    
Making social reproduction a point of entry for labour law does not however entail extending 
existing labour laws to unpaid domestic workers, as is sometimes mistakenly assumed. This is no call 
for ‘a uniform system of work regulation’126 applying to anyone engaged in ‘work’. The very point is 
to highlight that work relations take diverse forms, only some of which find recognition within the 
paid work paradigm of current labour law.127 As Zatz points out, with unpaid domestic labour, there 
is no formal employer or market relationship and no proper demarcation of working time.128 Indeed, 
the latter feature contributes to the legal problematisation of paid domestic work, particularly in a 
live-in context.129 On the other hand, and as we have seen in our exploration of the material and 
philosophical underpinnings of the paid/unpaid labour distinction, there are certain formal 
resonances which unite the marriage and the labour contract : they are both conceived as the 
product of agreement; they both create relations of subjection; and, whether we recognise it or not, 
they are both sites of labour activity which together produce economic value. Each is, or certainly 
has been, indispensable to the other; they are co-dependent.  
To require that labour law take account of unpaid domestic labour is simply to acknowledge this co-
dependence in the context of the wider economic and social eco-structure - and to attend to the 
implications – normative and conceptual - to which it gives rise.  To some extent this is already 
occurring in labour law scholarship. When Brian Langille calls for a new ‘constituting narrative’ for 
labour law, drawing upon Amartya Sen’s concept of human capabilities to connect labour law 
directly with the advancement of human freedom (understood in a rich developmental sense to 
encompass ‘the mobilization and deployment of human capital’),130  he is crafting a normative 
foundation for labour law in which social reproduction – the social and labour processes which go 
into nurturing human capabilities - must be central. The risk is, however, that it will continue to be 
overlooked. It is here that gender comes back into play, not as a social justice concern (although it is 
clearly important to continue to engage with gendered aspects of social injustice) but as an 
analytical category131 which casts particular light on the social organisation of work. Sex almost 
invariably features in any society’s division of labour and it is sex, or more broadly gender, which 
enables us to see and trace both the historical divergence of productive and reproductive work, paid 
and unpaid labour, and its contemporary convergence in the context of the radical economic and 
social restructuring which is the hallmark of postindustrialism. My primary focus in this chapter has 
been to explore the process of divergence and to probe its seepage into the conceptual and 
normative architecture of political and legal thought. By excavating the material and philosophical 
roots of the paid/unpaid work distinction, I have sought to show that the current conception of 
‘labour’ which underpins labour law is historically contrived and not universally prescribed; 
therefore, our continued allegiance to a paid work paradigm is neither necessary or inevitable. In the 
final section, I have offered some reasons why it might be timely to revisit that allegiance.  No doubt 
an opportunity to pursue that line of thinking further will arise in due course.  
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